Lawmakers craving more power

OK, voters, it's time for a Nevada civics quiz: How many times must the electorate vote against a proposed constitutional amendment to reject it, once and for all?

If you answered "once," you're wrong. The correct answer: No amount of "no" votes can make a proposed amendment go away -- not as long as the Legislature wants it approved.

Just six years ago, Nevada voters dismissed Question 10, a constitutional amendment that sought to significantly expand the power of the legislative branch at the expense of the executive branch. Question 10, known as Assembly Joint Resolution 13 during the 2005 session, was placed on the 2006 ballot by lawmakers and would have allowed the Legislature to call itself into special session, a power held exclusively by the governor.

Voters narrowly sided with checks and balances, with 52 percent of voters rejecting Question 10. Case closed?

Nope. It's back on the ballot in 2012. The Legislature wants more power, and it's not taking no for an answer.

It's too soon in the election process for the amendment to have a question number, so for now, it's known simply as Assembly Joint Resolution 5.

A majority of lawmakers have never liked the state constitution's 120-day cap on biennial regular sessions. That constraint was imposed by voters, another clear signal that the public wants lawmakers on the job as little as possible to minimize the number of new laws they can pass and the amount of damage they can do to the economy.

Foremost, AJR5 allows lawmakers to call themselves into special session if two-thirds of the members of each house sign a petition. That same two-thirds margin would override a gubernatorial veto (not to mention authorize a tax increase). The petition must specify the reason lawmakers are convening a special session, the kind of legislation they can pass and the date by which the session must start.

Additionally, AJR5 limits the duration of special sessions to 20 consecutive calendar days, unless the session is convened to impeach an executive or judicial officer or expel a lawmaker.

The only difference between AJR5 and Question 10 from 2006 is a provision that requires lawmakers to adjourn both special sessions and regular sessions by midnight on the final calendar day. For years, regular sessions have ended at 1 a.m. on what is actually the 121st calendar day to make up for the hour lost because of daylight saving time. Lawmakers leveraged that extra hour in a legal opinion that provided cover for their biennial procrastination.

So in exchange for giving them the power to call themselves into special session, lawmakers are willing to meet for one less hour during regular sessions. What a deal!

Most special sessions, especially the 10 held since 2001, have been very brief, scripted affairs -- even the budget-cutting sessions called in response to the recession. Absent aliens escaping from Area 51 and turning us into zombie slaves (any more than we already are), it's difficult to imagine a situation that would require lawmakers to huddle for three weeks between regular sessions.

AJR5 includes language that lawmakers may call themselves into special session only "on extraordinary occasions," an exceptionally subjective condition with no specific definition. AJR5 does not, however, limit the number of times lawmakers may call themselves into special session, an omission that could allow the part-time Legislature to become a full-time body -- and let lawmakers collect a full-time salary.

The primary argument in favor of AJR5 holds that the Legislature must be able to work if the governor is unwilling or unable to respond to a crisis. Additionally, most other state legislatures have the power to convene themselves outside regular sessions.

But the state has a succession of power if something terrible happens to the governor. And, tellingly, since 2006, two states have stripped their legislatures of the power to call themselves into session.

Whenever the Nevada Legislature puts a constitutional amendment before voters, it generally has some bipartisan support. Statutes can be hyperpartisan, but the state's founding document shouldn't be. AJR5, however, was sponsored by Democrats and passed on a straight party-line vote, with Democrats favoring it and Republicans opposing it.

The main reason: If one party ever gains two-thirds control of both houses of the Nevada Legislature, it will be the Democratic Party. Democrats will have an iron grip on the Assembly for at least the next decade, and while control of the Senate is up for grabs this November, Democrats currently hold that house as well. AJR5 is, essentially, a license for Democrat-dominated Legislature to do whatever it wants -- and take as much time as it wants to do it.

Testing the will of voters is nothing new for lawmakers. They've twice asked voters to surrender their power to select judges through elections and hand it to the political parties. Voters said no both times, but I expect they'll be asked again before too long.

And even if the electorate slaps down AJR5, as it did Question 10 in 2006, this proposal won't go away, either. We'll have to say no again and again.

Glenn Cook (gcook@reviewjournal.com) is a Review-Journal editorial writer.